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Summary 
This paper addresses one of the most comprehensive structural reforms in recent 
Norwegian administrative history: a merger of the employment and national insurance 
administrations, combined with more formal collaboration with the local government 
social services administration. The reform can be seen as a «whole-of-government» initiative 
intended to increase the co-ordinative capacity of government to address «wicked 
problems» cutting across existing policy areas and government levels in a multi-level 
governance system. This paper examines the following questions: First, what 
characterises the organisational thinking related to this reform? Second, how can we 
understand the reform process in terms of a transformative perspective combining 
instrumental, cultural and environmental features? Third, what would we expect to be 
the greatest specialisation and co-ordination challenges of the chosen structure? Fourth, 
what are the potential effects and implications of the new structure for political control 
and institutional autonomy, for relations between central and local administrations, and 
for the main goals stated? 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet fokuserer på NAV-reformen som er en av de mest omfattende reformer i 
nyere norsk forvaltningshistorie. A-etat og Trygdevesenet slåes sammen i en ny Arbeids- 
og velferdsforvaltning som samtidig skal he et formelt samarbeid med de kommunale 
sosialkontorene. Et viktig formål med reformen er å styrke den horisontale 
samordningen for å håndtere problemer som oppstår i spenningsfeltet mellom ulike 
sektorer og forvaltningsnivåer. Dette notatet undersøker hva som karakteriserer 
organisasjonstenkningen knyttet til denne reformen og hvordan vi kan forstå reform-
prosessene med utgangspunkt i et transformativt perspektiv som kombinerer instru-
mentelle, kulturelle faktorer og trekk ved omgivelsene. Vi fokuserer på utfordringer 
knyttet til spesialisering og samordning som den valgte løsningen medfører. Notatet tar 
også opp potensielle effekter og implikasjoner av den nye strukturen på reformens 
hovedmål, på politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi og på relasjonene mellom statlig 
og kommunalt nivå.  
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Introduction 
This paper addresses one of the largest reforms of public-sector co-ordination in recent 
Norwegian administrative history: a merger of the employment and national insurance 
administrations into a new employment and welfare administration, combined with more 
formal collaboration between this new administration and the local government social 
services administration. The aims of the reform are to create jobs and to make the 
administration more user-friendly, more holistic and more efficient. The reform can be 
seen as a «whole-of-government» (WOG) initiative intended to increase the capacity of 
government to address «wicked problems» cutting across existing policy areas and to 
improve vertical and horizontal coordination in the fields of policy and implementation.  
The WOG approach can be interpreted as a reaction to the New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms which have dominated reform efforts in many countries over the last 
two decades (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The NPM focus on vertical specialisation or 
devolution and on horizontal differentiation, based on the principle of «single-purpose 
organizations», has made the public apparatus in many countries rather fragmented 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Even though this development may have brought 
some advantages – such as clearer visions and goals, more professional autonomy, more 
easily measurable performance and results, clearer accountability and greater use of 
incentives – two of the major problems of fragmentation seem to be political control 
and coordination. These concerns are at the forefront of the post-NPM reforms now 
emerging in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, which were NPM trail-blazers (see Christensen and Lægreid 2006a).  
As a response to the increased fragmentation caused by previous reform programs, 
these countries have adopted co-ordination and integration strategies. In the second 
generation of modern public-sector reforms there has been a shift of emphasis away 
from structural devolution, disaggregation and single-purpose organisations and towards 
a whole-of-government approach (Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). The slogans 
«joined-up-government» and«whole-of-government» have provided new labels for the 
old doctrine of co-ordination in the study of public administration (Hood 2005). In 
addition to the issue of co-ordination, the problem of integration was also a main 
concern behind these reform initiatives (Mulgan 2005). While the terms are new, they 
represent old problems. Attempts to co-ordinate government policy-making and service 
delivery across organisational boundaries are not a new phenomenon (Ling 2002, 
Richards and Kavanagh 2000).  
The scope of WOG is pretty broad. One can distinguish between WOG policymaking 
and WOG implementation, between horizontal linkages and vertical linkages, and the targets 
for WOG initiatives can be a group, a locality or a policy sector (see Pollitt 2003a). 
WOG activities may span any or all levels of government and also involve groups 
outside government. It is about joining up at the top, but also about joining up at the 
base, enhancing local level integration and involving public-private partnerships. The 
WOG concept does not represent a coherent set of ideas and tools but can best be seen 
as an umbrella term describing a set of responses to the problem of increased 
fragmentation of the public sector and public services and a wish to increase co-
ordination (see Ling 2002). 
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WOG can therefore be seen as a reaction to the «siloization» or «pillarization» of the 
public sector that seems to be typical for the NPM reforms (Gregory 2006, Pollitt 
2003a). The principle of «single-purpose organisations», with many specialised and non-
overlapping roles and functions, may have produced too much fragmentation, self-
centred authorities and lack of co-operation and co-ordination, hence hampering 
effectiveness and efficiency (Boston and Eichbaum 2005: 21).  
WOG is seen by some as an efficiency measure and an answer to budgetary pressure, 
contradictory though that may sound following the introduction of organised 
fragmentation in the name of efficiency under NPM. A vertical tightening of the system 
combined with increased horizontal collaboration may now be seen as more efficient 
than a more fragmented system, with a focus mainly on efficiency in service delivery. 
Progress in ICT technology has reduced the cost of horizontal communication and co-
ordination, the influence of community expectations and consumerism means that 
citizens want services that better meet their needs, and there has been a shift of 
intellectual attention away from atomistic models and towards a greater emphasis on 
holistic approaches (Mulgan 2005). 
WOG-type coordination can take many forms, from smart practice and various new 
co-ordinative efforts, without structural changes, to organisational mergers and other 
structural co-ordinative measures. We will address the general question of how post-
NPM related reforms are formulated and designed, both in terms of process features – 
including the organisational thinking informing them – and in terms of the perceived 
effects of the reforms. How do political and administrative actors argue about such 
reforms and what are their potential effects and implications?  
In Norway administrative reforms at the central level have generally neglected co-
operation across sectors. Major reform measures, such as performance management, 
performance auditing, monitoring and control, have first and foremost been directed at 
the vertical, sector-based dimension of public administration (Christensen and Lægreid 
2001). Other reform measures, such as structural devolution through the formation of 
state-owned companies and semi-autonomous regulatory agencies, have, however, 
increased fragmentation and challenged vertical co-ordination. As a result of these 
movements, horizontal co-ordination between sectors has become more difficult at the 
central level. One consequence is that it is difficult to establish cross-ministerial co-
operation in policy areas (Fimreite and Lægreid 2005).  
By contrast, reform tendencies at the local level in Norway are more or less the 
opposite. In local government sectors have formally been merged and specialisation 
principles other than sectoral have become more important. Local horizontal co-
ordination has become easier, but at the same time the sector-based relationship 
between the central and local levels, so important in the Norwegian welfare state, has 
suffered (Tranvik and Fimreite 2006).  
In a multi-level system WOG approaches can also be a remedy for this relationship. 
Multi-level governance is the term for a government system where tasks and functions 
are carried out at different levels of government, implying an increased interdependence 
of public agencies operating at different territorial levels, often in a complex system of 
overlapping jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe 2004, Bache and Flinders 2004). The 
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functions can rarely be treated independently of each other, the different levels have to 
collaborate, and co-ordination between levels is important.  
In the Norwegian welfare state, the sectoral principle has traditionally been an 
important mechanism for co-ordination between different levels. However, when this 
principle ceases to be the main mechanism at the lowest level, co-ordination between 
levels becomes a challenge. It is this challenge that the WOG-initiative we are focusing 
on in this paper is intended to meet – by formally integrating services that are both 
central government responsibilities (employment and national insurance administration) 
and the responsibility of local government (social services). The multi-level aspect is 
further emphasised by the fact that different government levels have to co-ordinate 
tasks at the same territorial level and under the same leadership in the «one-stop-shop» 
arrangements in municipalities. 
As of 2006 the former National Insurance Administration (NIA) and the Directorate 
of Labour (DOL) in Norway are being merged into a single central agency for 
employment and welfare (NAV). Locally the NAV is establishing a one-stop shop 
system together with the social services administration. This front-line service is 
supposed to be run as a central-local partnership regulated by local agreements. Central 
government does not, however, assume local government responsibilities or vice versa. 
The reform is therefore also an important component of multi-level governance. 
This paper will address the following questions: First, what characterises the 
organizational thinking related to the establishment of NAV in a system of multi-level 
governance? Second, how can we understand the reform process in terms of a 
transformative perspective, combining instrumental, cultural and environmental 
features? Third, what would we expect to be the greatest challenges of the chosen 
structure for specialisation and co-ordination? Fourth, what are the potential effects and 
implications of the new structure for political control and institutional autonomy, for 
relations between the central and local administrations and for the main goals stated? 
Our empirical data are based mainly on an analysis of public documents. Before we 
elaborate further on the reform, we will give a brief introduction to the Norwegian 
political and administrative context, in particular to the three services that will be 
affected by the NAV reform. 
The Norwegian context 
The  b r oad  p i c t u r e  
Norway is a unitary, parliamentary and multi-party state with a small population spread 
over a rather large geographical area. Since the early 1970s, it has been ruled by minority 
governments, but this changed in 2005 when the Stoltenberg Red–Green majority 
coalition came to power. There is a strong democratic tradition in Norway, and 
collectivist and egalitarian values are important (Christensen 2003). Consensus-
orientation is crucial, the level of internal conflicts is low, and corporatist arrangements 
are well developed. Per capita income is relatively high and there is an abundance of 
natural resources. The level of labour market participation in Norway is high, also 
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among women and elderly people, and the unemployment rate is one of the lowest in 
Europe. 
Norway has a significant tradition of local self-government. Local authorities with 
their own elected democratic institutions have wide competencies. The Norwegian 
welfare state is one of the most comprehensive and universal in the world, with a large 
public sector. In the Norwegian model welfare politics are mostly decided at the central 
level, but they are adapted to local circumstances and implemented by local government. 
Local government is responsible for social welfare, elementary schools, care of the 
elderly and health care and thus constitutes a major part of the public sector both in 
terms of the number of employees and in terms of financial resources. The relationship 
between central and local government is a mixture of political decentralisation, based on 
the principle of local autonomy, and administrative decentralisation, based on the 
principle of delegated authority.  
Political control over the civil service has been general and passive, allowing the 
executive considerable leeway. This seems to reflect some major features of the 
political-administrative system: high levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes and 
norms among political and administrative leaders, within the public sector in general and 
in the relationship between central and local authorities (Christensen and Lægreid 2005, 
Fimreite et al. 2004). The level of trust in public institutions in Norway is generally 
higher than in most other countries (Norris 1999).  
The  ex i s t i n g  emp l oymen t  and  we l f a r e  o r gan i s a t i on  
The Norwegian Public Employment Service, headed by the Directorate of Labour (DOL), is 
about 120 years old and for a long time had a monopoly on its main services. 
Traditionally it has been seen as a major instrument of full employment, but during the 
last decade it has been modernised, diversified (so that it is now a multi-task 
organisation) and has had to compete with private providers of personnel/jobs. The 
service has around 3,800 full-time positions and is represented at all three levels of 
government: nationally through the DOL, regionally through its 18 regional offices and 
locally through its 162 local offices. The employment service holds responsibility for the 
operative implementation of the labour market policy of the government. In the course 
of 2004 about 466,400 persons were registered as active job-seekers. Its main task is to 
help people find a new job as quickly as possible, by helping them to carry out an active 
job search, providing personal advice, and helping them to gain additional qualifications. 
The service’s tasks also include researching the labour market, distributing economic 
benefits and control. 
The National Insurance Service, headed by its central agency the National Insurance 
Administration (NIA), is also an old administrative apparatus. It has about 7,600 full-
time positions, is represented in every county and municipality in Norway and handles 
more than 6 million cases annually. Close to 2 million persons receive regular benefits 
from the insurance service. The service is regulated by several laws, the main one being 
the National Insurance Law, which has three main goals: to provide economic security 
via a guaranteed income, to compensate citizens for expenses related to unemployment, 
pregnancy, maternity, single-parenthood, illness and injury, disability, old age and death 
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– reallocation of income and living conditions – and to help people to cope or help 
themselves on a daily basis.  
In contrast to the two other services, which are run by the central government, the 
social welfare service is the responsibility of the autonomous municipalities. Like the other 
services, it also has a long history. Responsibility for the poor (which eventually 
developed into a social security service) was one of two functions (the other was 
elementary schools) assigned to the Norwegian municipalities when they were formally 
established in 1837. Social welfare services are generally meant to provide a local social 
security net in the Norwegian welfare state. The services are regulated by the social 
services law and their main aims are: furthering economic and social security, improving 
the living conditions of underprivileged people, increasing social (and gender) equality, 
preventing social problems, and helping the individual to live and reside independently 
and lead an active and meaningful life in collaboration with others. In 2003 the 
municipal social welfare services had around 4,100 positions and about 135,400 persons 
were receiving financial assistance. 
The three types of services involved in the reorganisation were all affected in 
different ways by two structural ministerial changes: the first in 2003, when labour and 
social services were gathered in the same ministry, and the second in 2005, when the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion was established and assigned responsibility both 
for these services and for immigration administration. Together they employ 16,000 
people, are responsible for about 30 billion Euros annually, and have about half of the 
Norwegian population as users or clients. A number of concerns related to these factors 
had a bearing on the preparation for the reform we are looking into: one is that around 
700,000 persons of working age are either wholly or partially out of work at any given 
time. Another concern is that many users encounter a divided and sometimes 
fragmented administration. This is especially a problem for users who need help from 
more than one of the agencies and assistance that involves several services and 
government levels. A third concern is that having three services each dedicated to their 
particular area of responsibilities may potentially create areas for which no-one is 
responsible. Therefore one of the aims of the reform is to reduce the likelihood of such 
areas emerging.  
Theoretical approach 
Theory can be used in several ways. In this paper we will use it to describe the content 
of the reform, to explain the reform process and to point to challenges and possible 
effects. We will start by introducing a framework for categorisation based on a theory of 
specialisation and co-ordination in a multi-level system. Thereafter we will present a 
more explanatory framework based on a transformative perspective.  
The problem of co-ordination and specialisation in a multi-level system 
The reform analysed here is mainly about changing the principles of specialisation and 
the forms of co-ordination (see Wollmann 2003). Co-ordination and co-ordination 
mechanisms are challenged when the principles of organisational specialisation undergo 
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change (Verhoerst and Bouckaert 2005). The principle of specialisation is concerned 
with defining which tasks and relations can be grouped together and co-ordinated and 
which can be separated. In addition, different specialisation principles will enhance 
different networks, identities and conflict patterns. An organisation specialised 
according to geographical area served will encourage policy makers to primarily pay 
attention to particular territorial concerns. Sectoral specialisation, on the other hand, has 
a tendency to weaken relations that have been developed territorially, for example, based 
on geographical units such as municipalities, and to strengthen policy standardisation 
across territorial units.  
Redesigning sectorally specialised organisations into geographically structured ones 
will thus tend to transform functional conflicts into territorial conflicts (Egeberg 2001, 
2004). Generally, increased specialisation results in an increased need for co-ordination 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), but which specialisation principle is to be selected will be 
of considerable significance for the choice of co-ordinating mechanisms. In the reform 
studied, sector and territory as principles of organisation will be active at the same time. 
Three sectors are involved, as are three levels of government. The NAV service offices 
are also to be situated at the most local level, and the central government organisation is 
to have regional branches. It is important to understand how different mechanisms of 
co-ordination fit together with this complicated set of specialisation principles and will 
be addressed in our presentation of the reform as well as in the formulation of 
expectations. 
A transformative perspective 
Our explanatory point of departure is a transformative approach, focusing on the 
complex contexts in which political and administrative actors operate while trying to 
further reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). An instrumental perspective emphasises 
the relevance of structural factors for reform processes and effects and assumes that 
certain actors in certain structural positions have easier access to and more influence 
over decisions than others. Reforms are often dominated by leaders and selected 
experts. The decision-making structure in public organisations – the structure of 
participants – may be dominated by leaders in certain hierarchical positions or else there 
may be more collegial and balanced structures where several leaders are supposed to 
exert influence on a relatively equal basis. It is further taken for granted that such leaders 
will score high on clear means-end thinking or rational calculation, i.e. they will have 
relatively unambiguous intentions and goals and insight into the possible consequences 
of decisions and reorganisations (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). The access structure – the 
structure of problems and solutions – is either dominated by a few leaders and their 
problems and solutions, or else there is a tug-of-war between leaders and experts with 
different interests and arguments. 
In the present case, using this perspective means focussing on the central political 
and administrative actors and their patterns of influence and organisational thinking. 
Central questions are: Is the reform process dominated by the political leadership or is it 
characterised by negotiations about reform solutions? Are the arguments and reasoning 
connected to the main organisational models and solutions chosen unambiguous? And 
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more specifically – what arguments do the leaders use to connect the main goals with 
the co-ordinative solutions? Finally, what effects and implications might be expected of 
the main model chosen? 
The other perspective used is a cultural one. Public organisations have histories and 
traditions characterised by certain key informal norms and values, and this path-
dependency has a bearing on reform processes and effects (Selznick 1957, Krasner 
1988). If reforms are incompatible with these traditions, they will either be obstructed or 
modified (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). In our case, we ask how these traditions will 
influence the reform process and the effects thereof. How easily will the reform be 
accepted by the three administrations/services involved? What is the relevance of 
cultural resistance? And what might be the role of cultural resistance in obtaining the 
desired effects? 
A third perspective focuses on environmental features. These can be divided into two 
categories: technical and institutional (Scott 1998). The technical environment involves 
certain specific problems in and pressure from the environment – for example, the need 
to lower unemployment and to make the existing apparatus for employment and welfare 
more effective and efficient. The institutional environment is related to myths and 
symbols about how public administrations should be organised (Meyer and Rowan 
1977), in our case about which of the various co-ordination models should be chosen. 
We will analyse what relevance the environment has for both the reform process and 
reform effects. Is the reasoning behind the reform and the models chosen connected to 
pressure from the technical environment, reflected in instrumental thinking and 
predicted effects? Or is the relevance of the institutional environment more evident, 
implying that solutions will be of a symbolic nature and involve ambiguous thinking, 
leading one to expect few real effects? 
We now turn to the empirical part of the paper. We will first describe the reform 
process by focusing on the organisational aspects and then analyse the process using a 
transformative approach combining instrumental, cultural and environmental features. 
Finally, we will describe the challenges of specialisation and co-ordination posed by the 
chosen model. 
The reform process 
Ma i n  f e a t u r e s  
The process leading up to the final decision in the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) in 
2005 about a major reorganisation of the employment and welfare administrations can 
be divided into two major phases. We will focus on the latter. The first phase started 
with the declaration of the Bondevik I government in 2001, stating its intention to co-
ordinate the municipal social services with the government insurance administration and 
labour market/employment service. This part of the reform process was labelled SATS. 
The government’s proposal, which was based on the work of an inter-ministerial 
working group, was that the administration should continue to be divided into three 
parts (pensions, labour and social services), but a one-stop shop at the local level should 
be created encompassing the latter two services (St.meld. nr. 14  (2002–2003)). 
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The Cabinet was heavily criticised for this proposal, since it failed to respond to the 
Storting’s request for a number of different models for a merger of the three 
administrations or services. The Storting, therefore, returned the proposal to the 
government and asked it to consider various models for one joint welfare agency 
consisting of «today’s labor Market administration, National Insurance Service and the 
social welfare service». The government was thus compelled to start the procedure 
anew.  
The second phase of the process started with this renewed demand from the 
legislature. This time the government decided to establish an external public 
commission, consisting primarily of experts. The commission was established in 2003, 
and its mandate was to discuss the main question of co-ordination and the merger once 
more. However, the proposal the commission (NOU 2004: 13) came up with turned out 
to be pretty similar to the rejected proposal. It stated that there should be one 
administration for income and employment, one for pensions and rights, and one for 
social services, and that the latter should remain a local government responsibility. 
Understandably, the government was reluctant to present the Storting with a new 
proposal that was almost the same as the rejected one. It therefore proposed dividing 
the administration into two parts, consisting of a merger of the employment and 
insurance administrations, and a separate administration for social services. The 
introduction of a one-stop shop arrangement at the local level created the illusion that 
the two services were holistic/integrated, while in reality this consisted of two 
administrations collaborating with one another. The merged employment and insurance 
administrations remained a central government responsibility, while the social services 
continued to be administered by local government. This time the Storting accepted the 
proposal, even though it did not fulfill its original demand for a real merger and co-
ordination. We will now present the main features of this latter phase of the process by 
focusing on the organisational thinking and design.1 
The Commission’s report 
The public commission’s mandate covered two major aspects, one substantial and one 
more related to organisational questions. The first, substantial aspect described the main 
aims of reorganising the employment and welfare administration as: getting more people 
into work and reducing the number of people dependent on insurance schemes and 
social services; creating a more user-friendly welfare administration; and making the 
administration generally more efficient. It also emphasised the need to examine whether 
users with many and complex needs received a co-ordinated service. The second, 
organisational aspect was to discuss and evaluate the suitability of the various 
organisational models for fulfilling the main goals, among them a model with a single 
co-ordinated/merged administration. An interesting aspect of this mandate was that, 
although its first proposal had been sent back by the Storting, the government did not 
try to limit the options of the commission, a degree of leeway the commission definitely 
utilised in its work. 
                                                 
1 Some of the main analytical arguments and interpretations in this section is inspired by Haugneland (2006). 
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A reference group for the committee was set up consisting of members of user 
organisations, social partners, the National Association of Local and Regional 
Authorities, government agencies and other affected parties. The commission submitted 
the report in June 2004 and it was distributed to a broad selection of bodies for 
comment to be returned by November 2004.  
The report concluded that the main goals of labour market policy had generally been 
fulfilled, albeit with room for improvement for special groups like the unemployed, 
immigrants and older people in the workforce. The commission was more critical of the 
user-orientation of the administrations involved, and pointed to the fact that about 15% 
of the 2.4 million users of the employment and welfare administration had needs that 
encompassed more than one of the three separate administrations. Even though this 
figure was somewhat problematic to specify exactly, another important finding was that 
the longer an individual held the status of a multi-service user, the greater the 
involvement of more than one type of service. The commission viewed finding a better 
solution for this group as one of the main aims of the reform. Concerning efficiency, 
the report stated that centralisation of services meant that the need for direct contact 
with users was minor and that therefore money could probably be saved. The report 
also stated that the main goals of the reform could be fulfilled by using reorganision of 
the apparatus as an instrument, since the services were originally designed to respond to 
other needs and contexts. 
Against this background the report outlined and discussed the following four models: 
Figure 1. Summary of the models discussed in the report 
Central versus local government responsibility 
 
Model Number of 
services/ 
adm. 
 Employment  Insurance Social services 
1. Central government 
responsibility for welfare-
to-work 
3 Central Central Local 
2. Local government 
responsibility for welfare-
to-work 
2 Local Central Local 
3. Central government 
single agency model 
1 Central Central Central 
4. Municipal model 1 Local Local Local 
 
The commission did not advocate giving local government responsibility for following 
up the government’s welfare-to-work policy (Models 2 and 4). Model 3, which was 
closest to what the Storting had asked for, implied that the tasks of the Labour Market 
Administration, National Insurance Service and traditional social welfare offices would 
all be carried out by one agency. This model was not, however, recommended by the 
commission, since it was considered to create too much complexity and reduce the 
focus on employment, while potentially increasing the need for co-ordination.   
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The preferred model was Model 1, which had similarities with the model that the 
Storting had rejected in the first phase of the process. In our view this showed quite 
clearly that the commission was not controlled or steered by the government towards 
certain conclusions, but was free to make independent decisions. Model 1 
recommended two specialised services at the central government level, one for 
employment and income, with responsibility for services and payments related to 
employment and/or reduced ability to work, and one administration for pensions, 
family payments and health reimbursements, labeled a pension service system. The 
commission also proposed that the local authorities should retain responsibility for the 
social services. The model also adhered fairly closely to the existing way of organising 
the three services involved.  
The commission argued that establishing a central administration for employment, 
based on the National Public Employment Service and the employment-related parts of 
the National Insurance Service, would increase the likelihood of fulfilling one of the 
main goals of the reform. It also argued that a centralisation of this service would 
enhance cost-efficiency and increase professional competence. The main reason for 
proposing to split responsibility between two agencies was that this would be most cost-
efficient. The report stated that the second central administration proposed – a pensions 
administration that was a down-sized version of the existing one – would further the 
goal of being more user-friendly. This entailed making procedures less ambiguous, 
improving central control and standardisation, and providing more equal treatment and 
better-quality services.  
The report argued that a division into two types of administrations/services would 
dovetail with the two main aims and tasks of the employment and welfare 
administration. While the first type of task, connected to things like pensions and child-
care support, is more rule-oriented, the second, related to employment, is more 
discretion-based and constrained by the resources and abilities of users. The culture 
related to these services is more solution- than rule-oriented. The report argued that the 
local authorities should retain responsibility for the social services. The main arguments 
for this were that this would facilitate co-ordination with other local services and that 
complexity would be likely to increase if the social services were merged with 
employment-related services; the disadvantage would be the lack of employment-
orientation locally. The commission proposed that the new employment service should 
have a strong local presence and be located together with the social services, possible 
including the pension service. It did not, however, say much about how the services 
should be organised locally. 
When the report was delivered, a new minister had just been appointed, a former 
director of the National Insurance Administration. He signaled that he would probably 
not follow up the proposal from the commission, since he was more interested in 
creating an administration that was oriented towards user-participation.  
The bodies that commented on the report expressed different views on the 
organisational model. None of them supported a model where local government was 
assigned responsibility for all three services. The Association of Local and Regional 
Authorities and most of the local authorities supported Model 2. This model gave 
municipalities responsibility for following up the welfare-to-work policy. Most of the 
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other commenting bodies agreed that the current division of responsibility between the 
central and local authorities should remain unchanged. There were differences of 
opinion, however, about whether central responsibility should be given to one or two 
agencies. 
When the report was submitted, the division of ministerial responsibility had just 
been reorganised. Whereas previously employment issues had been located in one 
ministry and insurance and social services in another, the new structure created a new 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (from 2005 Ministry of Labour and Social 
Inclusion) to oversee both employment and social services. This removed much of the 
tension between the different ministers that had characterised the first phase of the 
process. By establishing the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 2003 the 
government made organisational changes that supported a comprehensive reform 
policy. Merging political responsibility paved the way for a co-ordinated effort to 
implement the reform. The new minister was also made great efforts to engage in a 
dialogue with the Storting, thus making the Storting more receptive to a solution that 
was not its first priority. 
The government proposal 
As mentioned earlier, the government had two main arguments for carrying out a 
reform of the employment and welfare administration. First, too many people of 
working age were outside the labour force and had been receiving benefits for a long 
time. Second, too many users were encountering a divided administration that did not 
meet their need for co-ordinated assistance across agency boundaries. The new proposal 
from the government was based on the same general goals as the report of the 
commission. One of the major arguments for the merger was that it was an important 
precondition for a fully integrated one-stop shop service locally. Under the slogan 
«More people at work – fewer on benefits» the government strove to create a more 
user-friendly system and a more co-ordinated and efficient employment and welfare 
administration. 
The government held a strong belief in reorganisation as the answer to the need for 
reform. The argument was that an organisational reform would not only mean changes 
in formal organisational structures designed to enhance co-operation and co-ordination 
and improve user-orientation, but would also more sensitive to political priorities, and 
should involve changes in organisational culture, competencies and working methods. 
The government proposed a merger of the employment and pension/insurance 
services into one service headed by a new central agency (NAV) (St.prp. nr. 46 (2004–
2005)). This proposal was a combination of Models 1 and 3 outlined in the commission 
report (see Figure 1). The social services were to remain a local government 
responsibility. It was now proposed to establish a new one-stop shop arrangement at the 
local level, bringing together the new merged service and the social services.  
The government argued that employment and pensions had more in common than 
the report suggested. Users often needed to use both services and a merger would 
therefore be more user-friendly. The chosen solution was, however, also said to be an 
advantage for the employers. It was argued that the merger would reduce co-ordination 
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costs at the ministerial level, improve cost-efficiency through advantages of scale and 
also bring potential benefits for strategic planning. Budgeting, steering and the creation 
of result indicators were also stressed.  
The government attached more importance than the Commission had done to 
establishing a front-line service that would be the users’ gateway to all services in the 
employment and welfare administration. The government also stressed certain 
preconditions for an efficient local one-stop shop, mentioning both structural and 
cultural changes, even though local discretion and variety are generally a favoured 
option. Local agreements would be established based on a formal central agreement 
between the government and the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional 
Authorities. Local leadership-training and joint competence-enhancement programs 
were also mentioned.  
Summing up, the government proposed two major organisational changes. First, it 
wished to establish a front-line service with an employment and welfare office in every 
municipality. Legally the front-line service would be based on a binding agreement 
between the central and local authorities laid down in local co-operation agreements. 
This partnership between central and local government was designed to provide co-
ordinated services better adapted to users’ needs and to replace the present system of 
three different offices in each municipality. A network of local offices would constitute 
a co-ordinated front-line service with responsibility for employment, sick leave, medical 
and occupational rehabilitation, disability pensions, financial social assistance, pensions 
and family benefits.  
Second, central government responsibility would be concentrated in one agency: the 
employment and welfare service (NAV). The government proposed closing down the 
present Labor Market Administration and the National Insurance Service and 
establishing one new government agency that would co-operate closely with the 
individual local authorities.  
The new system is a radical departure from the employment and welfare 
administration, but it also represents a complicated arrangement of central-local 
government co-operation and division of responsibility. The division of responsibility 
between central and local authorities has not changed in a fundamental way. Political 
responsibility for the national insurance service as well as for labour-market policy 
remains with central government, while financial social assistance remains a discretion-
based, means-tested benefit under municipal management. Both the co-ordination 
between the three services at local level and the one-stop-shop idea, however, represent 
challenges for services and government levels that are used to territorial as well as 
cultural distance.  
This government proposal received the support of the Storting, even though it did 
not include a full merger. The standing committee for social affairs emphasised the 
challenges of merging two services with different cultures, goals and steering measures 
and pointed out the need for careful planning and implementation. Several of the 
political parties said it was imperative that the new model(s) at the local level should 
produce better co-operation among the services, and they also stressed the user-
friendliness and cost-efficiency aspects of the proposal. The Progressive Party, the far 
right-wing party, proposed Model 3, which envisaged central government control of the 
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merged services, including social services, but this proposal was not supported by any of 
the other parties. 
As a consequence of the Storting’s approval of the government proposal an interim 
organisation for the new employment and welfare organisation (NAV) was set up in 
2005 and the new agency was formally established on 1 July 2006. Legislative 
amendments providing for a new employment and welfare administration were 
approved by the Storting in 2006 (St.prp. nr. 46 (2004–2005)). The plan is that the front-
line service units will be in place throughout the country by 2010.  
The main challenges will be, first, to establish a new, co-ordinated front-line service 
with user-oriented employment and welfare offices all over the country; second, to bring 
about constructive co-operation between the central and local authorities; and, third, to 
create an efficient merged central government agency based on established agencies with 
very different cultures, tasks and professions. 
Analyzing the process, organizational challenges 
and potential effects 
Exp l a i n i ng  t he  p r o ce s s   
How may a transformative approach help us to understand the decision-making process 
and above all the organisational thinking? To start with, in terms of the decision-making 
structure and the pattern of participants, the process has some peculiar features. 
Following the Storting’s initial «no» to the proposal from the government and its 
demand for a merger of the three types of services, one would, on the basis of a 
hierarchical instrumental perspective, have expected the government to organize a rather 
closed and controlled evaluation process in order to ensure a result that complied with 
the Storting’s demands. This was not the case, however. Instead, the government 
engaged in what looked like a complicated negotiation process, which was opened up 
through the use of a public commission with a wide mandate. Its only constraint was 
the Storting’s demand for a more user-oriented service that took account of multi-
agency users, as one of three major goals. The solution proposed by the commission, 
which was similar to the one that had been rejected by the Storting in the first round, 
was then modified by the government, reducing the administration from three services 
to two. This solution, which represented a concession to the Storting, could be seen as a 
compromise, and was eventually accepted by the Storting. This may well have been a 
tactical use of the commission, but it also entailed redefining goals in the course of the 
process, which was then reflected in a new ministerial structure and a new minister. 
If the organisational thinking in the process is analysed from an instrumental 
perspective, the organisational model looks rather weak and shallow. The goals stated 
are general and rather vague, the tensions between them are largely ignored, specific 
problems are seldom discussed, and proposed solutions do not have a strong basis or 
analytical background. Normally, organisational thinking involves instrumental or 
rational features. Yet, the original solution sought by the Storting – a single merged 
service – while reflecting some post-NPM thinking about the advantages of horizontal 
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de-specialisation, was not particular rational, given that there was no discussion of 
whether there was a real problem with multi-service users or of the possible 
disadvantages arising from the heterogeneity of users in a merged service.  
The management model for the new employment and welfare organisation is based 
on NPM tools. Management-by-objective-and-results is a main principle for steering 
and control, and performance indicators and reporting are a main component of this 
system. It introduces the balanced score-card principle, focusing on multiple objectives 
and the relationship between tools and user outcomes. In addition, knowledge 
management and a formalised and generic quality-management system are applied, 
based on user surveys and quality assessments (see Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 
2006). Thus, the model is a hybrid of central NPM management tools and post-NPM 
whole-of-government features. 
In defining multi-service users as a minor problem the public commission was acting 
instrumentally and it therefore proposed only minor structural adjustments. And while 
proposing specialisation first according to aim and then according to geography is 
consistent with the statement that there are two distinctive goals and tasks, it is not very 
consistent to argue that social services partly overlap with the two other services without 
proposing a restructuring. Here the commission was following basic political logic: for 
by giving priority to local co-ordination and local democracy it was probably anticipating 
that proposing a solution for the social services administration that took account of the 
needs of the central government would lead to political problems. The report also said 
that the one-stop shop should be based on employment needs, without really specifying 
why. 
The government argued that employment and insurance had a common goal, and 
therefore proposed merging the two services, arguing that this would make them more 
effective. However, the whole solution was based on the premise that this would 
improve the situation for multi-service users – a premise that was not well founded. It 
argued for a one-stop shop with a divided structural solution, but it was not clear about 
whether bringing the two services together physically would modify this and create an 
integrated service.  
The cultural-institutional perspective can be used to explain the decision-making structure 
in the process, at least partially. The open mandate for the committee, which did not 
follow up on the demands from the Storting, may signal that the government’s primary 
intention was to attend itself to the long-term norms of determining the internal 
structure of the executive apparatus while giving the experts leeway. 
The process may also be seen in terms of competing types of appropriateness among 
the actors (Christensen and Røvik 1999, March 1994). Like the first group of experts 
(path-dependency), the commission of experts saw few reasons for supporting real 
mergers in the structure. The Storting, without bothering to analyse the problem more 
closely, claimed that merging the three administration/services into a more holistic 
structure was the most appropriate solution, simply because it believed that this was the 
way to solve co-ordination problems. In addition, the government deemed it 
appropriate to focus chiefly on the multi-user problem, resulting in its proposal to 
merge employment and insurance, without daring to touch, for political reasons, local 
responsibility for the social services. All the main actors were concerned that cultural 
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traditions would hamper the desired the desired effects of the reform, and they hence 
stressed the need to develop a new common culture, both between the spheres of 
employment and insurance, in the newly merged employment and welfare 
administration, and also with regard to the local one-stop shops and collaboration with 
the locally based social services. 
The environmental perspective, which embraces a complex combination of technical and 
institutional elements, may also be used to explain certain aspects of the process. The 
sectors involved have a large number of strong interest groups, and by establishing a 
reference group consisting of such actors it was possible to lend the process additional 
legitimacy. By the same token, forming a commission of experts as a response to the 
Storting’s criticism of the initial proposal allowed the government to challenge the 
Storting’s view that multi-agency users were the main problem and to use the facts 
delivered by the commission to make it look like an exaggeration and a myth. The view 
that merging the services would bring about major improvements may also be seen as a 
post-NPM counter-myth and deviates from the dominant NPM-myth of specialisation. 
The focus on user interests and efficiency also involves some typical NPM symbols, and 
hence can be classified more as rhetorical than rational. Indeed, if these goals are 
operationalised, it becomes obvious that they run counter to each other or at least that 
there is a tension between them.  
The modified solution that the government returned to the Storting may also be seen 
as a myth, since the alleged advantages of a full merger also acquired a symbolic status 
and an overly specialised solution was thus ruled out. It is also interesting that the final 
solution was presented, probably intentionally, as one merged administration, when in 
fact it was two. This would seem to indicate that the media have also become caught up 
in symbolic values.  
Summing up, the process can be seen as a combination of instrumental, cultural and 
environmental features as indicated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Features of the process that can be interpreted from the different perspectives constituting the 
transformative approach 
Instrumental perspective: 
*Multi-service users defined as minor problem 
*Consistency in aims and arguments 
*Local self-government as a priority 
Cultural perspective: 
*Open mandate for the commission 
*Decision by government 
*Different types of appropriateness among actors 
*Awareness of different cultural/professional traditions in the three services  
Environmental perspective: 
*Interest groups engaged 
* Expert commission with open mandate 
*Post-NPM myth 
*The symbolic status of a merger 
De s c r i b i ng  t he  cha l l e nges  o f  c o - o rd i na t i on  and  
spec i a l i s a t i on  
How can we describe the new NAV model using our theoretical framework of 
specialisation and co-ordination? One main challenge rises from the combination of two 
principles of specialisation: the specialisation of central government according to sector 
or function and the specialisation of local government according to territory. These two 
principles come together in the front-line units, and it is a big challenge to build a 
common professional platform, to clarify roles, responsibilities and authority, to 
construct a unified management executive model, to harmonise budgets, services and 
benefits, and to build a common culture and new competencies. 
Another challenge is related to horizontal co-ordination on different levels. One 
aspect here is the horizontal intra-ministerial co-ordination between the employment 
and insurance administrations and other areas in the ministry; another is the inter-
ministerial co-ordination between the employment and welfare administrations, on the 
one hand, and other related policy areas such as education and health on the other. 
There are also concerns about vertical co-ordination involving the instruments the 
ministry has to influence social services locally in the tension between functional and 
territorial specialisation. The advantage here is that all the relevant areas now come 
under the ministry, potentially furthering coordination; the disadvantage is that the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion is huge, and the political leadership may have 
REFORM OF  THE  EMPLOYMENT  AND WELFARE  ADMINISTRATIONS WORKING PAPER  14  -  2006  
  23
capacity problems. Another aspect is whether the different levels of the NAV agency 
will really manage to co-ordinate employment and insurance services as planned. A third 
aspect is local co-ordination with the social services inside the one-stop shops. 
This complex structural design clearly creates a need for co-ordination, but there is 
also the challenge of balancing the three main goals or considerations of the reform – 
employment, user-friendliness and cost-efficiency – in the new structure. It is not easy 
to see how this can be done, partly because the goals are rather vague and the degree of 
success is difficult to measure, but also because they are potentially contradictory or 
attend to different groups. How easy is it, for example, to improve user-orientation and 
at the same time become more cost-efficient? How well do employment and insurance 
services fit together when it comes to improving their relationship with their users? 
Employing more people is, of course, a goal that is affected by other factors such as 
international economic developments, the national structure of the labour market, 
industry policy, regional development, education, etc.. So what role does structure play 
in fulfilling this goal alongside all these other factors? One advantage of the new 
structure may be that a closer relationship with social services may mean people with 
social problems more easily establish a connection with the employment apparatus and 
find it easier to get a job. The same may apply to the connection of certain groups to the 
insurance programs. On the other hand, the increased complexity may create confusion 
in the newly modernised employment service, and may impede job-placement. In 
addition the group of users connected to the insurance service includes a lot of elderly 
people and therefore does not overlap much with the employment function. The same 
is the case for many social services users. 
A key indicator of fulfillment of the goal of increased user-friendliness is how well 
the newly established local one-stop shops function. This is partly a structural challenge, 
because the newly merged employment and insurance services will have one set of 
formal structures, law, rules, tasks and personnel, while the locally based social services 
will have a completely different one. What are the control instruments and incentives 
furthering local collaboration between the two types of services? And what about the 
participation of users locally? What is the relative importance of a simplified procedure 
for applying for services and assistance vis-à-vis the actual results of these applications? 
In other words, are people more oriented towards process than results, or the other way 
around? Another aspect of local structural challenges, for example, is how well their IT 
systems fit together. The challenge here is to make what were previously three different 
systems compatible, and the NAV has expended a lot of resources to this end. 
One challenge mentioned by many actors in this process is the cultural one. How 
easy is it to merge a judicial culture (insurance), designed to deal with individual cases, 
with a modernised employment culture, embracing a broader range of social science 
competencies and more complex problems, and with a local social service culture based 
on local knowledge and a client-oriented discretionary culture? As mentioned in the 
commission’s report, path-dependency is strong in all three services and may prevent 
local collaboration in the one-stop shops from working smoothly. Therefore, both the 
government proposal and the Storting committee’s report envisage the training of local 
leadership locally and the development of local professional competence and culture as 
part of a more systematic human resources management strategy. 
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The goal of increased cost-efficiency seems to have received less attention than the 
other two main goals. This probably reflects the Norwegian tradition of avoiding 
redundancies when major public reforms are implemented, a principle that was also 
adhered to in this reform. Rationalisation of human resources is an aspect of NPM 
ideology largely ignored in Norway. Thus, while economy of scale was mentioned 
during the process, there was little discussion of where resources could be saved and 
how these might be used alternatively. 
The reform in many ways builds on post-NPM views of co-ordination and 
collaboration and also pays heed to the trend towards a reassertion of the centre, even 
though there is a major focus on local solutions. There seem to be two major aspects of 
co-ordination that are important challenges, and there is still some ambiguity about how 
they will be solved. The first one is vertical co-ordination, meaning how the central 
government should secure control over the new services and standardise them. This co-
ordination could be based either on political control, indicating a traditional, centralised 
structure; or on production, suggesting more devolution-oriented solutions; or else on 
rights, making greater use of independent appeals bodies, for example. One aspect here 
is the relationship between the ministry and the central agency (NAV) for the merged 
employment and insurance services. The organisational solution apparently envisaged 
here is a more traditional ministry-agency relationship, where there is a balance between 
control and autonomy. A second aspect is the internal vertical co-ordination inside the 
NAV agency, and a third the inter-governmental or inter-level relationships between the 
central agency and the regional and local parts of the apparatus. A fourth is co-
ordination with the local leadership. 
Po t en t i a l  e f f e c t s  and  imp l i c a t i on s  o f  t he  new  
s t r u c t u r e  
Viewed in a historical perspective, the merger of the employment and insurance 
administrations in Norway is rather unique. Never before have two such large sectoral 
administrations been merged. In 1992 there was an attempt to merge the tax and 
customs administrations, whose tasks would appear to be more closely related than 
those of employment and insurance. However, the attempt failed, primarily because the 
tax administration was against it and got political support for its position (Haugen 2005). 
The director of the tax agency argued very strongly that the tax administration had such 
a special culture that it could not possible be merged with another organisation 
(Grøndahl 2004). The current reform is even more complicated because it also involves 
social services based locally. Never before have central and local government co-
operated in this way in the form of a one-stop-shop system at one geographical level. 
The first question to be raised is whether this new administrative apparatus is likely 
to increase political control over the administrations and services involved or whether it 
will instead increase institutional and professional autonomy. The preconditions for 
more political control are certainly there. First, the sectoral ministry has overall 
responsibility for all the services involved, i.e. it has instruments at its disposal for 
potentially controlling the locally based social services, meaning that co-ordination is 
easier than if the services had been divided among several ministries. But the Ministry of 
REFORM OF  THE  EMPLOYMENT  AND WELFARE  ADMINISTRATIONS WORKING PAPER  14  -  2006  
  25
Labour and Social Inclusion is large and encompasses several other policy areas, like 
immigration, so there are concerns with capacity problems. Second, the services being 
merged will have different structures and cultures to cope with, something that does not 
point in the direction of increased institutional and professional autonomy. However, if 
the process of creating a homogeneous structural and cultural service is successful, this 
picture may change. Third, the two merging services are centrally based, while the social 
services are locally based, which would potentially give the central apparatus the upper 
hand, particularly if the NAV agency is closely controlled by the ministry. The final 
structure of the new apparatus has not yet been laid down in detail, so there is some 
leeway for a structure based on production units and with more emphasis on 
independent appeals bodies, which would potentially undermine political control; 
however, there are few indications that this will be the main solution. 
The new reform model means that the central-local relationship is no longer simply a 
territorial one. Rather, the two levels of government now operate at the same 
geographical level and within the same office. For multi-level governance in Norway 
this is a totally new experience. This new arrangement will definitely solve some co-
ordination problems, but it is also expected to create others. An independent political 
level, with its own political bodies, now manages one third of the office, while the other 
two thirds are managed by delegated central government power. One important 
stipulation of the reform is that whatever model or solution is eventually chosen for the 
organisation of the one-stop-shop locally, it must be situated in one locality and 
managed by one chief executive. This is new in Norwegian administration, and an 
important question is if and how it will effect the autonomy of local self government, 
both in this particular area and more generally. 
Another main aspect of the reform as a post-NPM reorganisation is the effects of 
some of the main co-ordinative efforts made. Are they realistic and will they produce 
the desired results when it comes to fulfilling the major goals? As pointed out earlier, 
the organisational thinking behind the reforms is rather shallow and weak, often based 
on rather loose assumptions about the connection between the merger and relocation 
and the effects on services and users. One major question is whether the reorganisation 
is overly geared to coping with multi-service users. While these users are indeed likely to 
be better off with a co-ordinated structure, the outcome of the merger for the remaining 
85% who normally use only one of the original services may actually be negative. For 
these users the merger may create more complexity and confusion and hence a poorer 
service is potentially there. Thus, the new administration is likely to have a highly 
differentiated internal structure or it may even engage in new reorganizations to spin off 
some units that do not naturally belong together. One can of course hope for «smart 
practice» and seamless internal collaboration, but there is obviously a concern that 
operations may not run as smoothly as that. 
There are also some question-marks concerning the one-stop shops and the 
collaboration between the two merged services and the social services locally. Will the 
new collaboration be based on a common understanding about how to realise the main 
goals of the reforms, or will there be structural and cultural problems? One particular 
tension in the new structure that is not easy to solve is that the new merged employment 
and welfare administration, headed by the NAV agency, is likely to attend primarily to 
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national goals and values of standardisation, while the social services are naturally closer 
to the culture and concerns of the local administrative apparatus, which result in some 
divergence. Whether bringing the administrations together physically in local one-stop 
shops will have any effect on this is more of an open question. A study of the emerging 
tendency to establish one-stop shops or local service-collaboration units for several local 
services in Norway has revealed advantages for the users but also tensions between local 
professions and cultures and a wide variety of local organisational solutions (Mehus 
2003).  
Conclusion 
There is a tension between WOG initiatives, such as the NAV reform in Norway, and 
performance-management systems (Pollitt 2003b). Performance management has 
encouraged individuals as well as organisations to meet their own performance targets, 
and there has been a tendency towards some fragmentation of organisational forms. In 
contrast, the NAV aims to promote co-operation, networks, and collaboration between 
organisations. Nevertheless, performance-management systems have been kept and 
developed further as a main steering technique. Unless cross-cutting targets get equal 
status as organisation-specific targets, this combination may run into a lot of problems. 
WOG initiatives, such as the NAV reform approach, have a strong positive flavour 
and are generally seen as a good thing. But it is also important to stress that the «silo 
mentalities» that these reform initiatives are supposed to attack exist for good reasons 
(Page 2005). Well-defined vertical and horizontal organisational boundaries should not 
only be seen as a symptom of obsolescent thinking (Pollitt 2003b). A division of labour 
and specialisation are inevitable features of modern organisations, implying that WOG 
initiatives will be difficult to implement. Working horizontally is a very time- and 
resource-consuming activity. A critical Canadian study of horizontal management 
recommended that horizontal arrangements should be entered into only after careful 
thought and an estimate of the costs involved (Bakvis and Juillet 2004).  
The NAV approach also raises other difficulties, such as unintended risks, ambitious 
agendas and uncontrolled consequences (Perry 6 et al. 2002). Accountability and risk 
management are central concerns. A key question is how one can have joint action, 
common standards and shared systems, on the one hand, and vertical accountability for 
individual agency performance on the other. Lines of accountability are not entirely 
clarified. The challenge is to achieve a better balance between vertical accountability to 
central government, horizontal accountability to local government and to agencies in 
other related policy areas, and responsiveness downwards to users and clients (Ryan and 
Walsh 2004). 
Our empirical data indicate that there are contradictory forces pulling in different 
directions when it comes to adopting a WOG approach such as the NAV reform (see 
Peters 1998). On the one hand, central government has been pushed to decentralise 
decision-making. On the other hand, the centre has been encouraged to strengthen its 
capacity to co-ordinate policy development and implementation. Several competing 
strategies have been advocated and implemented to enhance new employment and 
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welfare administration, implying that the reform content is actually more fluid and 
contested than might be inferred from the use of this rather homogeneous term (Ling 
2002).  
One similar example is the Centerlink case in Australia, which was established as a 
one-stop, multi-purpose delivery agency to provide services primarily in the area of 
social security and unemployment. One important conclusion from the experience of 
the Australian reform is that structural reform of government organisations involving 
functional boundaries designed to improve performance can still leave public officials 
with the problem of how to bridge vertical separation and horizontal divisions (Halligan 
2004). Centerlink is an organisation that has been associated with ambiguity and 
contradictions and with conflicts between organisational imperatives, representing a 
hybrid of different organisational models such as a departmental model, a customer-
driven model, an entrepreneurial model and a political model. The new employment and 
welfare organisation in Norway may well encounter the same challenges. 
It is also important to stress that high-level politics and changes in central 
government organisations are not necessarily the most important reform tool for 
promoting «whole-of-government» initiatives. NAV is to a great extent about lower-
level politics and getting people on the ground in municipalities and local government 
organisations to work together. WOG needs a co-operative effort and cannot easily be 
imposed from the top down (Pollitt 2003b).  
Attention must also be paid to the fact that building a WOG system is a long-term 
project that takes time to implement. Acquiring new skills, changing organisational 
culture, and building mutual trust relations all need patience. The role of a successful 
reform agent is to operate more as a gardener than as an engineer or an architect (see 
March and Olsen 1983), but this requires time and the Norwegian government’s aim is 
to establish employment and welfare offices all over the country rather quickly. 
Above all, it is important to underline that WOG initiatives such as NAV are far 
from being only a question of neutral administrative techniques. Accountability, 
legitimacy, power relations and trust in government organisations are fundamental 
political issues (Perry 6 2005). Even if governments set budgets, programs, and 
objectives that cross organisational boundaries, WOG activities may still be limited 
unless there are fundamental changes in accountability systems, dominant cultures, and 
structural arrangements. 
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Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
WORKING PAPER  14  –  2006 REFORM OF  THE  EMPLOYMENT  AND WELFARE  ADMINISTRATIONS 
 34
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
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27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
